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Abstract- With the evolution of wireless technology and use 
of mobile devices, Mobile Ad-hoc Network has become 
popular among researchers to explore. A mobile ad-hoc 
network (MANET) is a self-configuring network of mobile 
routers (and associated hosts) connected by wireless links. The 
routers and hosts are free to move randomly and organize 
themselves arbitrarily.  It allows mobile nodes to communicate 
directly without any centralized coordinator. Such network 
scenarios cannot rely on centralized and organized 
connectivity, and can be conceived as applications of Mobile 
Ad-Hoc Networks. Thus, MANET is vulnerable due to its 
dynamic network topology, as any node become untrusted at 
any time. The Black hole attack is one kind of security risk in 
which malicious node advertises itself to have a shortest path 
for any destination, to forge data or for DOS attack. In this 
paper, to detect such nodes effectively, we propose a 
Permutation based Acknowledgement for most widely used 
reactive protocol ad-hoc on demand distance vector routing 
AODV. This mechanism is enhancement of Adaptive 
Acknowledgement (AACK) and TWO-ACK, here we have 
tried to show the efficiency increment by decreasing number 
of messages routed in the network.  
Keywords: MANET, Black Hole, Permutation, Security, Ad-
hoc network 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad-hoc Network is collection of anonymous 
nodes communicates with each other in decentralized 
manner without the need of any centralized router or server 
and without help of any fixed topology. All nodes are self-
configure and communicate over relatively bandwidth 
constrained wireless links. Since the nodes are mobile, the 
network topology may change rapidly and unpredictably 
over time. As network is decentralized, all network activity 
including discovering the topology and delivering messages 
must be executed by the nodes it selves, i.e., routing 
functionality will be incorporated into nodes. 
As MANET starts gaining popularity, the security issues 
[1] has become one of the primary concerns because 
MANET is vulnerable to various type of attack such as 
passive or active attack. Passive attack does not affect the 
communication over the network it only read the 
confidential information. Active attack affects the normal 
operation of network by altering it. A Black hole attack is 
an Active attack, which intentionally drops the packet. It is 
a malicious node that attracts all packets by using forged 
RREP to falsely claiming a fresh and shortest route to the 
destination and then discards them without forwarding 
them to the destination. This is depicted in Fig. 1. The main 
purpose of malicious node is to disturb the communication 
over the network and affect data availability. 
In this paper, we propose Ad-hoc On-demand Multipath 
Secure Routing (AOMSR) a Black hole node detection 
system for mobile Ad-hoc network using a Permutation 
Based Acknowledgment (PBAck).  This technique uses 
Ad-hoc Distant Vector Routing (AODV) protocol to 
achieve this goal. AODV is used because it is a simple and 
efficient routing protocol designed specifically for use in 
multi-hop wireless ad-hoc network. This mechanism solves 
the Black hole node problem using a less number of 
broadcast messages, as compared to other proposed and 
used technique so far. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In MANET, Security issues have always been a hot 
topic and many research monograms / articles are available 
in the literature that deals exclusively the black hole 
problem. Following are related works that are done 
previously:- 
Lu et al. [2] proposed SAODV which may be 
considered as an extension to the AODV. On receiving a 
RREP packet, the source node verifies a secure path to the 
destination node by sending SRREQ packets. The SRREQ 
contains a secret code (a random number). After receiving 
at least two such packets, the destination node responds 
back with SRREP packets. The SRREP also contains a 
secret code (a random number). When the source node 
receives at least two such packets, it chooses the shortest 
among them as a secure path to the destination node for 
data transmission. 
Deng, Li and Agrawal et al. [3] also propose a method 
which verifies security of the path after receiving a RREP 
packet. It requires each node to send back the next hop 
information also when it sends back the RREP packet. 
After receiving the RREP packet, the source node sends a 
FurtherRequestpacket to the next hop of the intermediate 
node. Only the next hop can send back a FurtherReply 
packet. The source node decides a secure route on the basis 
of this FurtherRequest packet and declares the malicious 
node as black hole. The drawback of this approach is an 
increased delay in the network. 
Alem and Xuan [4] propose a solution Intrusion 
Detection using Anomaly Detection (IDAD). It uses host-
based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) scheme to monitor 
the activities of a host. An anomaly activity is detected on 
the basis of audit data which is collected and is given to the 
IDAD system. It compares every activity of a host with the 
audit data on the fly and isolates a host (node) if any of its 
activity resembles an activity in the audit data. However, 
there are several drawback of this method. It requires extra 
memory, slows down the system and is impractical to 
implement in some hostile scenario. 
Venkatraman and Agrawal [5] present an external attack 
prevention and internal attack detection model for AODV. 
The external attack prevention model secures the network 
from external attacks by implementing message 
authentication code to ensure integrity of the route request 
packets. The internal attacks are detected by internal attack 
detection model which uses traces of local data to identify 
and isolate the misbehaving nodes. However, it has a high 
false positive rate as sometimes it is difficult to differentiate 
abnormal behavior with normal behavior. 
Pushpa [6] presents a modified approach of AODV 
which is based on trust and gives equal weight to both route 
trust and node trust for the route selection process. 
Continuous evaluation of node's performance and 
collection of neighbor node's opinion value about the node 
are used to calculate the trust relationship of this node with 
other nodes. 
Medadian et al. [7] present a routing protocol to combat 
black hole attack in MANET. It is a trust based method 
where the sender takes opinion of the neighbors of the node 
(say, node A) which replied with a RREP packet, i.e., 
advertises the shortest route to the destination. This opinion 
along with a rule base determines whether node A is 
malicious. 
Mahmood and Khan [8] present a survey of methods to 
combat black hole attack on AODV routing protocol. 
Pramod and Govind [9] propose a comparatively simple 
and efficient method to detect and isolate black hole in a 
network with minimal routing overhead. 
Botkar and S.R. Chaudhary [10] have proposed AACK, 
which is Advanced Acknowledgment, it may be consider as 
combination system of an Enhanced TWOACK (E-
TWOACK) scheme and an End-to-End Acknowledgment 
scheme. The difference between the E-TWOACK and 
TWOACK [14] is that in TWOACK technique it detects 
the malicious link and, in E-TWOACK technique it detects 
the malicious node instead of link that’s why the detection 
efficiency gets increased. 
III. BASIC CONCEPTS: 
A. AODV Routing Protocol: Ad-hoc on demand distance 
Vector Routing (AODV) [11] is a simple and efficient 
routing protocol designed especially for use in multi hop 
wireless Ad-hoc network. AODV is a reactive protocol in 
which routes are created only when they are needed. It uses 
traditional routing tables, one entry per destination, and 
sequence numbers to determine whether routing 
information is up-to-date and to prevent “counting to 
infinity” problem. 
When a node wishes to transmit data to a host to which 
there is no route, route discovery will be carried out, it will 
generate and broadcast routing request message (RREQ), 
routing reply message (RREP) is unicasted back to the 
source of RREQ, and route error message (RERR) is sent to 
notify other nodes of the loss of the link. HELLO messages 
are used for detecting and monitoring links to neighbors. 
B. Black Hole Attack: A black hole attack [12] is a type 
of denial of service attack that can be easily employed 
against routing in Ad-hoc networks. In this attack, a 
malicious node tries to attract all packets by advertises 
itself as having the shortest path to the any destination 
node.  
 When the attacker node receives, an RREQ message, 
without checking its routing table, immediately sends a 
false RREP message giving a route to destination over itself 
after hop count value is set to lowest values and the 
sequence number is set to the highest value to settle in the 
routing table of the victim source node. Therefore source 
node assumes that route discovery process is completed and 
ignores other RREP messages and begins to send packets 
over attacker node. Attacker node attacks all RREQ 
messages this way and takes over all routes. Therefore all 
packets are sent to a path, they are simply dropped and will 
not be reached to appropriate destination. 
IV. PROPOSED CONCEPT 
We propose a Ad-hoc On-demand Multipath Secure 
Routing (AOMSR) method which uses Permutation Based 
Acknowledgement (PBAck) to detect the malicious node. A 
Source needs to store multiple paths from source to 
destination based upon maximum delay endured in 
receiving data.  
 
Figure1: Assume MANET system 
Detailed Process is as follows. Consider a Source node 
S and Destination node D. There are several paths from S to 
D. but based upon shortest path estimated time “t”, and 
maximum allowed delay from “t+δ”, S chooses K paths 
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Figure 3: Data Hash Table (DHT) 
Figure 2 is showing a data structure appended to the 
message header, which will indicate the message coming 
from the which path (PN), this message’s permutated 
acknowledgement (PBA) should be sent from which path 
(PAckN), total number of path which can be useful to 
receiver to understand making Data Hash Table (DHT), and 
Type of Message ToM, which is significance of the 
message type either Data or Path. 
Figure 3 is representing a data structure called Data 
Hash Table (DHT), which will be created at source and 
destination node, to keep track of data packets received and 
its PBA is sent or not. 
Sender S will send different data packets via different 
paths with path number (PN) and Permutated 
Acknowledgement Number (PAckN) such that PN and 
PAckN are not same number to destination, at the same 
time S will keep all sent data packet’s PN, PAckN, Path, 
and several flags like flag for path is good or bad (FGB), 
Flag for path is Free or Busy (FFB) in a table. In this 
example three data packets will go via three paths with 
PN=1, 2, 3 & PAckN=3, 1, 2 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4: Data packet flow 
Destination D receives data packet stores its all relevant 
entries in a table. And sends Permutated Acknowledgement 
to destination via pre decided paths. 
 
Figure 5: PBA packet flow 
In this example data packet 1’s Acknowledgement has 
to come from path on which data packet 2 is sent, because 
data packet 2 has PAckN as 1, same way data packet 2’s 
PBA has to come from path 3 and data packet 3’s PBA has 
to come from path 2, if destination receives all data packets 
correctly, then it will send all Permutated 
Acknowledgement PBA correctly. 
Consider a scenario where a node is malicious node and 
drops the packet, than Destination D will not have its PN, 
PAckN, and Path so D will not be able to send its 
Permutated Acknowledgement PBA to different path and 
some received data’s PBA to that path. So Destination will 
not receive two PBA for one data lost, for example if node 
“n6” in path 2 is Black hole attacker it has no connectivity 
to Destination and drops the packets, data packet with PN 
as 1 and PAckN as 3 reaches destination correctly, data 
packet with PN, PAckN as 2,3 does not reaches to 
Destination and data packet with PN, PAckN as 3,2 is 
received , as soon as Destination receives data packet form 
path 3, it will send on this path PBA of data packet 1, and 
waits for data packet with PN, PAckN as 2,1. At sender 
side till timer goes off, only one PBA of data packet 1 have 
been received via path 3 so sender will understand that data 
packet 1 and 3 have been received correctly as PBA of 1 is 
received and form path 3, and as PBA of 3 via path 2 is not 
received and PBA of 2 via path 1 is not received so there 
can be Black hole attacker node in path 2. 
 
Figure 6: System with Black hole node 
Now Sender will send path which may contain Black 
hole attacker node “S-n4-n5-n6-D” in a data packet setting 
Type of Message (ToM) as 0 via path 3, because it is 
marked now as Good path. Destination will receive data in 
which path is there, and check for its node which has 
announced to have connectivity with Destination D, here 
n6, if D has no neighbor as n6, then it will be marked as 
Black hole attacker node and Alarm packet will be 
broadcasted. 
 
Figure 7: PBA in system with Black hole node 
V. ASSUMPTION 
While proposing this concept we have assumed some 
factors which are as below: 
A black hole attacker will announce its direct 
connectivity with Destination to reduce the hop count and 
maximize the sequence number. 
There is no cooperative black hole attack such that all 
attackers from different paths, chosen by sender can 
communicate with each other without sending data to 
destination otherwise they compromise and send a forged 
PBA to source node, and source node will never know 
about existence of black hole attacker and Destination will 
never get data packets 
VI. ALGORITHM 
Source node:  S 
Destination node:  D 
Route Request:  RREQ 
Route Reply:  RREP 
Modified Routing Table:  MRT 
Destination Sequence Number: DSN 
Hope Count:  HC 
Flag path good/bad:   
Good-1   Bad-0 
FGB 
Flag path free/busy:   
Free-1    Busy-0 
FFB:   
Path P 
Path Number:  PN 
Permuted Acknowledge Number:   PAckN 
Permuted Acknowledge: PBA 
Total number of Paths:  NP 
Type of Message: 
Data -1,Path-0. 
ToM  
Modified Routing Table MRT 
Data Hash Table:  DHT 
PBA sent / received PSR 
Intermediate nodes:  n1, n2 … nk. 
Assumed Source to Destination Data 
delivery time 
T 
Assumed estimated Source to Destination 
Data delivery time via shortest path:  
Tmin 
Maximum delay acceptable than estimated 
time:  
δ 
Table 1: Parameters used in the algorithm 
Sender to Receiver: 
STEP 1: GeneratePath() : Desired number of path creation 
Require: Auxiliary ‘‘S’’ node wants to start transmission 
of data to destination ‘‘D’’ node, for which it don’t have 
path. 
 
1. S broadcasts RREQ packet with destination 
address of D in the network. 
2. if RREP received 
2.1. Set in MRT DSN, HC, P 
3. else go to 1. 
4. end if 
 
STEP2: SelectMultiPath() 
Require: S has to select paths to send data from all paths 
stored in MRT  
1. PN0, NP0; 
2. while (1) 
2.1. KeepP whose T ≤ Tmin + δ. 
2.2. Assign PN to P. 
2.3. NP = NP+1. 
2.4. PN=PN+1. 
3. end while 
 
STEP 3: GeneratePermuatatedPath(NP) 
1. for  1 to NP 
1.1 generate a permutated sequence of PAckN such 
that PN ≠ PAckN. 
2. end for 
 
STEP 4: FormDataPacket(PN,PAckN,NP,P) 
Require: S produces data packets DP. 
1. Set PN, PAckN, NP, ToM=1 to message header 
2. Set in DHT PN, PAckN, P, FFB=0, FGB=0.  
3. Send DP to path PN. 
 
STEP 5: ReceivesPBAck(PBA):  
Require: When S receives Acknowledgement PBA  
1. search entry E such that PBA’s PN =E’s PN in DHT. 
2. if  E is found 
2.1. set E’s PSR  1, FGB  1, FFB   0. 
2.2. search entry E2 such that PBA’s PAckN = PN. 
2.3. set E2’s FGB 1 , FFB  0. 
3. end if 
4. else discard PBA. 
 
STEP 6: TimerGoesOff ( ): 
Require: Sender’s timer for acknowledgement goes off  
1. if timer goes off 
1.1. search entry E in DHT such that PSR = 0 && 
FGB = 0. 
1.2. if E is found. 
1.2.1. form a DP with data as path of E. 
1.2.2. ToM 0. 
1.2.3. Send DP via smallest path which has FGB = 
1. 
1.3 end if 
1.4 end if 
 
Receiver to Sender: 
STEP1: PocessDataPacket ( DP )  
Require: D receives data packet DP, stores its PN, PAckN, 
and Path P in DHT, 
1. if  ToM ≠ 0 
1.1 search for entry E in DHT such that DP’s PN = 
PAckN in DHT. 
1.2 if entry E is found . 
1.2.1 Send PBA to path of E. 
1.2.2 Set PSR 1. 
1.3 end if 
2 search for entry E in DHT such that DP’s PAckN= 
PN in DHT. 
3 if entry E is found && E’s PSR = 0. 
3.1 send PBA of E’s Data to Path of received DP. 
3.2 set PSR 1. 
3.3 set FGB  1, FFB 1. 
4 end if 
5 else if ToM = 0 
5.1 Destination stores data as path and checks the node 
which has announced direct connectivity to D 
5.2 if node does not exist in D’s neighbor list than  
5.2.1 Mark node as Black hole attacker node, 
5.2.2 broadcast Alarm Packet. 
5.3 search for this path P in DHT. 
5.4 Set FGB as 1. 
5.5 Reply this to Sender S.  
5.6 end if 
6. end if 
VII. ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
To find the efficiency of our proposed concept to find 
the Black hole attacker in a MANET system, we compare 
with the concept proposed in [10]  
In paper [10], if “n” is the number of nodes in a 
MANET system within the presence of Black hole attacker 
node. 
In absence of black hole attacker node in network, for each 
data sent form sender S to destination D, One “End to End 
Acknowledgement EEACK” will be sent from D to S, 
which will cause “n” transaction of intermediate nodes of 
EEACK.  
If EEACK has not been received due to black hole 
attacker node or link failure or damaged ACK packet. 
System will start running in to E-TWOACK [13] mode 
which overall performs “2*n” transactions in between 
nodes as in following example 4 nodes will create 8 ACK 
transactions. 
In below example there are four intermediate nodes, 
which will cause eight ACK transactions. 
 
Figure 8: E-Two-Ack working and transaction in four nodes 
So on an average there will be 3n transactions (2n for E-
TWOACK +n for EEACK) for detection of black hole 
attacker node. 
Total number of ACK transfers = 3n 
In our proposed system 
Let’s assume: 
Number of Data path = k  
Maximum Intermediate nodes form S to D in each path= n. 
Total PBA transactions =k*n. 
where, Per data “n” PBA will be sent by destination. 
If any PBA has not been received and its path is 
flagged as Bad, corresponding path will be sent to 
Destination D via any Good flagged path (FGB=1), which 
will cause another “n” data transactions. 
So, total “2n” communications will be carried out find 
Black hole attacker node efficiently. Fairly which is better 
than [2] by 33.33% because instead of using bandwidth by 
3n we use 2n transactions and Detecting malicious node is 
more accurately. 
 
RO = Routing_Overhead 
CP = Control_Packet 




With above calculations as proposed in [2], CP = “2n” 
(of E-TWOACK), DP = “n” so RP = 66.66%. 
In proposed scheme  
For “p” malicious path out of “k” available paths p < k. 
CP = “p*n” , DP = “k*n” , where k is number of data path . 
 
For different values of p and k calculation table is as 
follows: 
 K =     
P = 1 2 3 4 5 
1 50.00 33.33 25 20 16.66 
2 -NA- 50 40 33.33 28.57 
3 -NA- -NA- 50 42.55 37.5 
AACK 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 
      
 K =     
P = 6 7 8 9 10 
1 14.28 12.5 11.11 10 9.09 
2 25 22.22 20 18.18 16.66 
3 33.33 30 27.27 25 23.07 
AACK 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 
Table 2: Analytical values of Routing Overhead for  
          different malicious paths & total paths  
 
Figure 9: Routing overhead vs. Number of path  
 
Figure 9 shows theoretical comparison of AOMSR and 
AACK for routing overhead. AOMSR uses multiple paths 
and hence routing overhead decreases as number of paths 
increase in steady simulation without path breaks. 
VIII. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
Proposed method has been implemented in NS2. The 
simulation consists of different number of nodes placed 
randomly in rectangular region. For data transmission 
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) transmits UDP based traffic over 
random mobility model of nodes with 2MBPS bandwidth, 
each data packet is 512 byte long. Mobile nodes are 
assumed to move randomly as per random way point model 
[15].  
IX. RESULTS 
To measure two performance metrics of Throughput and 
Routing Overhead two simulation environments are chosen 
with constant mobility and variable mobility over 
traditional AODV and AOMSR implementation. 
Network throughput = Number of data packets Received/ 
no of data packets Sent. 
Routing Overhead = Total number of control packets 
transmitted by nodes while establishing and maintaining 
routes.  
A. CONSTANT MOBILITY 
Mobility is constant between 0 and maximum speed 10 
m/s with pause time 30 seconds for each simulation. 
Simulation time is 300 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 10: Throughput (bps) vs. Number of Nodes 
Figure 10 shows comparison between AOMSR and 
AODV with respect to throughput. Number of packets 
received is decreasing as network size and number of 
network increases, due to increasing number of path breaks. 
Our proposed AOMSR increases the packet delivery due to 
availability of multiple paths. 
 
Figure 11: Routing Overhead vs. Number of Nodes 
Figure 11 represents Routing Overhead comparison 
between AOMSR and AODV with respect to number of 
nodes. Theoretically AOMSR outperforms AACK, 
practically we compared proposed scheme with AODV. 
AOMSR gives lower overhead in larger network due to 
availability of multiple paths while AODV performs route 
computation when route break detected. 
 
B. VARIABLE MOBILITY 
Number of nodes is between 10 to 50 and mobility 
kept varying between 10 to 50 m/s. Simulation time is 300 
seconds. Average numbers of all observations are taken to 
generate graphs. 
 
Figure 11: Throughput (bps) vs. Node Speed 
Figure 11 represents throughput with respect to node 
speed. Probability of link failure increases with high node 
speed, hence as shown, with high node speed throughput 
decreases in AOMSR as well as AODV. 
 
Figure 12: Routing Overhead vs. Node Speed 
Figure 12 represents relationship between routing 
overhead and Node speed. With high node speed routing 
overhead increases in AOMSR and AODV significantly. 
X. FUTURE WORK 
The simulation of this project can also be conducted by 
varying topologies on the basis of factors: Behavioral 
properties of node (the number of black hole attacker and 
good nodes involved in communication). Other factors such 
as mobility speed of the nodes, load over network, priority 
of data packets etc. may also be varied to evaluate their 
impact on a protocol's performance. The experimental 
scenarios and findings can also be verified by using other 
simulation tools like GloMoSim, NCTUns, Omnet++ etc. 
Throughout this project, we have chosen Throughput, 
number of packets as overhead. Other parameters such as 
end-to-end all packets’ delay, efficiency of finding black 
hole attack or packet delivery fraction may be used to 
compare performance. 
The detection of malicious node mechanism for AODV 
has the most potential for improvement and significant 
work has been done and proposed in this area. We have 
chosen the multiple paths routing to detect black hole 
attacker efficiently, to reduce end-to-end delay and to 
increase throughput. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
MANET is an increasingly emergent field in which 
various researches are putting their effort to solve the 
problem of various attacks in it like Black hole attack. 
MANET has great potential in various diverse areas, e.g., 
military, disaster management, intelligent transportation 
system, monitoring, public safety. However, it poses a 
greater security risk in comparison to conventional wired 
and wireless networks due to its inherent properties. In this 
paper, we propose a simple, efficient and effective method 
with minimum routing overhead and good throughput to 
combat the black hole problem. It does not require any 
database, extra memory and more processing power. The 
simulation and results clearly mention about accuracy of 
AOMSR even theoretically & analytically our propsed 
scheme is better and more effective than others. In Future, 
we put our best efforts to make it more efficient to find 
Black hole node. 
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